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In this article the author works out an interpretation of 
the present crisis which attempts to understand its 
deep-seated causes and therefore make it possible to 
influence its course successfully. 
In the first place, he outlines the historical frame-
work in which the existing situation can be viewed, 
from the establishment of the outward-looking devel-
opment pattern in the last century, to the process of 
increasing transnationalization in recent decades 
which is culminating in the present crisis. He then goes 
on to discuss the nature of the crisis today, both in the 
centres and in the periphery, with the aim of determi-
ning whether it is a transient and superficial phenome-
non, or, on the contrary, is symptomatic of a profound 
and prolonged upheaval, Some forecasts of the future 
of the world economy are next presented, so as to 
evaluate the probable conditions with which the pe-
ripheral countries will have to cope in the forthcoming 
decades. 
Lastly, in his conclusions, he suggests the course of 
action that should be followed in face of the crisis. Its 
principal aspects are the reactivation and opening-up 
of the central economies; an equitable internal and 
international distribution of the cost of the external 
debt, with the establishement of debt service on new 
bases; orientation of development policies towards ex-
port promotion and satisfaction of the needs of the 
most deprived sectors; and emphasis on regional co-
operation. 
*Co-ordinator of lhe Joint EI:LA/UNEI> Development and 
Environment Unit, and Professorial Fellow, Insrilule of De-
velopment Studies, University of Sussex. The present 
document was prepared at the request of the Third World 
Foundation, which the author wishes to thank for permitting 
its publication in the CKPAI. Review. The opinions expressed in 
the article arc personal and in no way commit any of the 
institutions mentioned. 
I 
The current dilemma 
The development policies of Latin America since 
the Second World War have been inspired by two 
main theoretical sources: post-Keynesian devel-
opmentism and neoliberal monetarism. The first 
is associated with R. Prebisch and ECLA and the 
second with M. Friedman and the Chicago 
School. Obviously, reality is always more com-
plex and finely-shaded than analytical distinc-
tions, but the latter fulfil a useful function of 
conceptual clarification. The purpose here is to 
single out two theoretical conceptions that in-
spire different policies, and two historical 
periods, in which first one prevails and then the 
other, until they culminate in the current crisis, 
when once again they dispute the leading role.-
Post-Keynesian developmentism places 
emphasis, in internal affairs, on the development 
of the material productive forces of industry, of 
,agriculture, of the basic social capital and human 
resources infrastructure; externally, on regional 
integration and public international co-
operation. The State and planning play a major 
role in the promotion of social and economic 
development and in international relations. This 
approach prevailed during the 1950s and 1960s 
with varying degrees of intensity and coherence 
in different countries. 
Neoliberal monetarism, with its emphasis on 
the liberalization of the money, goods and servi-
ces and labour markets, on external openness in 
respect of trade and finance, and on the develop-
ment of internal financial systems, and its pro-
motion of private and market economic agents in 
preference to the State and to planning, began to 
establish itself in the 1960s and prevailed in 
many countries in the 1970s. 
This transition —in some cases moderate, 
pragmatic, complex and intelligent, but not so 
much so in others— reached extremes of ideolo-
gical radicalization in a number of instances, par-
ticularly in the countries of the Southern Cone. 
Although these national differences were deter-
mined, to a great extent, by the historical experi-
ence and the economic, social and political struc-
tures of each country, the general trend towards 
a transition from development strategies that 
were more protectionist and State-controlled to 
others more open to the exterior and privatizing 
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was undoubtedly connected with the changing 
international scenario of the post-war decades. 
The great world depression of 1929-1932 and 
the Second World War initially encouraged de-
velopmentist strategies. In contrast, the process 
of expansion of the international private 
financial system begun in the mid-1960s accentu-
ated the influence of monetarism, culminating in 
the present international economic crisis. This 
crisis now confronts every country, more or less 
In my opinion, there is a close relation between 
the degree of integration or désintégration of the 
international economy —and in particular of the 
international financial markets— and the degree 
of protectionism or openness of the national 
economies, their resource allocation criteria, 
their options between consumption and 
investment, the form taken by their power 
structures and the degree of State intervention, 
all of which is reflected in conceptual and 
economic policy reformulations. 
During the period of outward-looking de-
velopment, which extended from the nineteenth 
century up to 1930, there was a close economic, 
commercial and financial integration at the in-
ternational level which resulted in the predomi-
nance of the pound sterling —a currency which 
enjoyed strong economic as well as military back-
ing—, and found expression in wide and in-
creasing international flows of trade, credit, 
investment and even migration. This world 
set-up of the British Empire and its zones of 
influence, such as Latin America, was 
accompanied by national situations of little 
protection and very open economies, both at the 
centre and at the periphery. This led to a process 
of allocating resources in relation to comparative 
advantages. As the comparative advantages 
acquired by the centre were concentrated mainly 
in manufacturing industry, its export trade 
became specialized in manufactures, and as the 
countries of the periphery had not gained similar 
advantages, they specialized in sectors 
urgently, as the case may be, with a crucial 
economic policy dilemma: either submission to 
an extremely severe recessive adjustment of a 
monetarist character, such as transnational 
financial capitalism is trying to impose, or 
recovery and maintenance of a sufficient degree 
of freedom to implement reactivating policies in 
the framework of a strategy based on develop-
ment of the national and regional productive 
and social forces. 
characterized by intensive use of natural 
resources and labour. 
To this structural situation corresponded a 
specific organization of political power: a domi-
nant coalition was formed by the exporter sectors 
(manufacturers at the centre, raw materials pro-
ducers at the periphery), the importer sectors 
(raw materials in the centre, manufactured 
goods at the periphery), the big businessmen 
and, above all, the financial sectors. Their in-
terest in maximizing international trade and fi-
nance resulted in relatively little State 
intervention in the economy, except for the 
purposes of creating the infrastructure services 
required by the outward-looking growth model, 
or imposing the rules of the game. Laissez-faire 
policies predominated, and their rationalization 
in ideological and theorical terms —i.e., the 
classic liberal theory of market allocation of 
resources both at the national and at the 
international level (static theory of comparative 
advantages). 
This stage of capitalistic development ended 
in the great depression of 1930, followed by a 
long interregnum preceding the United States 
hegemony that arose after the Second World 
War. During this period some profound 
readjustments took place: international markets 
disintegrated; the international private financial 
market disappeared, as did direct private invest-
ment; and only a few modest trade flows re-
mained. The generalized crisjs in trade, finance 
and international private investment was mani-
II 
The privatization of the international financial system 
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fested in all countries in serious imbalances on 
their international transactions and in a severe 
depression of economic activity. Most countries 
withdrew from the international system and 
isolated their economies by applying 
protectionist measures in the field of trade and 
exchange controls in that of finance. 
It is important to stress that this protec-
tionism occurred simultaneously in the centre 
and at the periphery. Import substitution was 
not a perverse invention of the peripheral coun-
tries or of Prebisch and ECLA, as some econom-
ists of little historical culture seem to believe: it 
was also, and at the same time, the recourse to 
which the central countries turned in order to 
meet the crisis. Each country protected and en-
couraged what it had formerly imported: the 
central countries essentially protected their 
agriculture, and thence arose a whole 
institutional apparatus of support and 
promotion of agriculture which is still —50 years 
later— a very serious obstacle to international 
trade and the agricultural production of the 
Third World. 
In our countries, for their part, the 1930 
crisis led to generalized protection of manufac-
turing, and marked the beginning of a phase of 
deliberate development of import-substituting 
industry. A gap was thus created between the 
internal and the international price systems, re-
flected in a change in the relative prices of agri-
cultural commodities and industrial goods. 
Consequently, an adjustment took place in the 
allocation of resources: at the periphery towards 
the development of manufacturing and at the 
centre towards agricultural development. This 
process did not happen automatically, but 
through decisive State action and a 
rearticulation, in both types of countries, of the 
hegemonic coalition of power within the ruling 
classes. This coalition dominated by exporter, 
importer, business and financial interests, was 
ousted —not without radical political conflicts— 
by a coalition based mainly on entrepreneurial 
sectors, middle-class groups and the organized 
working classes, a change that was reflected in 
the importance attached to production, employ-
ment and income distribution in overcoming the 
crisis. 
These were the decades from the 1930s to 
the 1960s, which were characterized in many 
Latin American countries by governments that 
suscribed to active State intervention in support 
of industrial development; investment in infra-
structure; some structural reforms; income re-
distribution through an increase in social expen-
diture; and public policies favouring the middle 
income and low income groups.1 In the interna-
tional field regional integration and co-oper-
ation were actively fostered, as was public 
technical and economic co-operation between 
developed and underdeveloped countries, 
though this did not preclude denunciation of the 
iniquities and injustices of the system of interna-
tional economic relations. 
With the appropriate reservations, the post-
war picture of the industrialized countries —the 
United States, the European countries, and Ja-
pan— is not so very different. There too the State 
assumed a leading role in respect of the reactiva-
tion and reconstruction of the economy; the 
technical development and modernization of the 
productive forces; the correction of unfair in-
come distribution by application of the concept 
of a Welfare State; and the adoption of system-
atic full-employment policies. In Europe, more-
over, very marked emphasis was placed on re-
gional integration and co-operation. 
The institutional modernization of the State 
and the practice of planning figured in both de-
veloped and developing areas as guiding instru-
ments that modified and complemented the 
market. The economic theories in vogue re-
volved around economic growth in the centre 
and development policies in Latin America, 
where the subject of planning acquired outstand-
ing importance. Theoretical discussion was 
focused on criticism of traditional neoclassical 
and Keynesian (static) economic theory, in 
relation to the need for a growth theory 
(dynamic and post-Keynesian), structural 
change and development. 
While this was occurring on the internal 
stage, the international economic system was also 
trying to recover from the 1930 débâcle. During 
the next decade, international trade toned up, 
but private investment, both direct and financial, 
had completely disappeared. Instead, some pub-
1
 Here I am referring to the propositions, intentions and 
measures incorporated in development policy, not to what 
was actually achieved. 
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lie institutions were set up, such as Eximbank in 
the United States to facilitate export expansion. 
Faced with the disappearance of the internation-
al private Financial system after the end of the 
Second World War, an international financial 
system of a public character was created under 
the Bretton Woods agreements, including, in 
particular the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). TO these organizations 
were added later on the regional development 
banks such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), the public bilateral and multilateral 
Financial aid institutions and the State agencies 
responsible for extending export credits. By the 
mid-1960s the establishment of a public 
international financial system had been comple-
ted. 
During the 1950s and 1960s direct interna-
tional private investment reappeared, now em-
bodied in the transnational corporations, which 
at First were solely North American, and later 
European and Japanese as well. They took ad-
vantage of the national markets created in the 
peripheral countries under the aegis of protec-
tionist measures and industrial development 
policies, jumping commercial barriers by estab-
lishing local subsidiaries. 
This was the start of a process of transna-
tíonalization of the structure of production, 
which subsequently extended to patterns of con-
sumption, life styles and culture.* The close of 
the 1960s saw the first steps in the re-creation of 
an international private Financial market, whose 
expansion during the following decade attained 
extraordinary dimensions. A new period of in-
ternational economic integration —this time of a 
transnational character— now dawned, begin-
ning with the recovery of trade and the transfer 
of patterns of consumption and life styles, con-
tinuing with the expansion of transnational pri-
vate investment and patterns of technology and 
production, and culminating, especially after 
1973, in the creation of a transnational financial 
market of a private character, controlled by a few 
big transnationalized banks, which gradually ac-
aSee O. Sunkel and E. Fuenzalida, "Transnationaliza-
tion and its National Consequences", in José J. Villamil (éd.), 
Transnational Capitalism and National Development, Hassocks 
(Sussex), The Harvester Press (in association with the Institu-
te of Development Studies, University of Sussex), 1979. 
quired great freedom of manoeuvre as they out-
grew supervision by the national Financial auth-
orities. 
It is of interest here to underline five central 
characteristics of this process. In the first place, 
the re-creation and accelerated expansion of this 
new international capital market, which had 
disappeared 40 years before and which grew 
from US$ 12 billion in 1964 to almost US$ 700 
billion in 1982 (see table 1). Secondly, the pri-
vatization of external Financing: in 1961-1965, 
60% of the inflow of external financial resources 
into Latin America was of public origin and 40% 
came from private sources; in 1978 public 
financing had shrunk almost to nothing —7%— 
and the share of private Financing had risen to 
93% (see table 2). Thirdly, the predominance of 
the banking system in this capital market: in 
1961-1965, out of the 40% inflows of foreign 
private capital, 25% was direct private 
investment and only 2% bank Financing, 
proportions which in 1978 were radically 
different; bank financing increased to 57% and 
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Source: Stephany Griffith-Jones, international Finance and La-
tin America: Past and Future, ALIDÏ. (forthcoming), table!. 
a
 Refers to December for the years 1964 to 1981, and to 
September for 1982. 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA:* PERCENTAGE STRUCTURE OF NET INFLOW OF 
EXTERNAL RESOURCES. 1961-1968 
Percentage structure 
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Source: Stephany Griffith-Jones, International Finance..., op. cit., table 4. 
^Includes the member countries of the Inter-American Development Bank and its subregional agencies. 
bIncludes the socialist countries and the OECD members except the United States. 
Inc ludes credits for nationalization. 
' 'includes financial institutions other than banks. 
direct private investment dropped to 16%. 
These two phenomena also signified that the 
large-scale expansion of credit was channelled 
essentially towards the petroleum-exporting and 
semi-industrialized countries, bypassing the 
poorer countries which do not represent an at-
tractive market for the private banks. 
Fourthly, the oligopolization and subse-
quent monopolization of the international capi-
tal market. The copious inflow of external finan-
cing into many countries and enterprises was 
organized by some 30 big transnational banks 
which obtained a considerable proportion of the 
financing from hundreds of small and medium-
sized banks through the system of syndicated 
loans. For the purpose of managing the crisis and 
obtaining monopoly rents from the renegotia-
tion of debts, the oligopoly has turned into a 
monopoly formed by about seven or eight large 
North American banks which join forces for soli-
dary self-protection in ad hoc committees.3 
Fifthly, in consequence of all the foregoing 
circumstances, the total lack of public control 
and responsibility with respect to this process of 
expansion of the international financial oligop-
oly, features which are at the very heart of the 
present financial crisis, and are shared equally by 
the transnational banks, the governments of the 
industrial countries that are hosts to the banks in 
question, and the governments of the over-
indebted countries. 
Here the governments of the OPEC coun-
tries and of the Third World in general wasted a 
unique opportunity to convert the obsolete Bret-
ton Woods institutions into an international pub-
lic system genuinely representative of the inter-
ests of the community of nations, accountable to 
their governments, and directed towards promo-
tion of the development of the Third World and 
preservation of the dynamism and stability of the 
international economy. 
Just as Monsieur Jourdain spoke prose un-
3See R. Devlin, "Commercial bank financed from the 
North and economic development of the South: congruence 
and conflict", and "Renegotiation of Latin America's debt: 
an analysis of the monopoly power of private banks", in CEPAL 
Review, No. 9, December 1979, and No. 20, August 1983, 
respectively. 
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awares, throughout the 1970s we have lived 
through the equivalent of a Marshall Plan, with-
out referring to it or even noticing it. The recom-
mendations of the Brandt Commission were in 
fact applied, but avant la lettre, in accordance with 
market criteria, and by the transnational banks, 
instead of by a public international mechanism, 
sober, responsible and under the control of the 
national States. The result was, on the one hand, 
a fundamental Keynesian contribution to the 
maintenance of some degree of expansion of the 
international economy during the 1970s, which 
enabled it partly to overcome its trend towards 
stagnation as from the end of the 1960s; and, on 
the other hand, a colossal waste of productive 
resources during that period, since they were 
allocated, in part at least, to financing Pharaonic 
and over-sized investment projects which were 
left incomplete or only partially in use; to a great 
increase in luxury consumption; to the 
production and purchase of armaments; and 
even to flight of capital and corruption. 
This chaotic situation contrasts with that of 
the public international financial system and, in 
general, with the whole of the international sys-
tem of bilateral and multilateral co-operation 
and aid for development which prevailed in the 
1950s and 1960s. That mechanism, despite all its 
deficiencies, implied certain social criteria as re-
gards anti-cyclical stabilization and resource allo-
cation policies, which were superseded by pri-
vate, bank and market criteria, and, in the last 
analysis, as far as can be seen, by sheer lack of 
judgment. Under the first system referred to the 
allocation of international public financial re-
sources was subject to State mediation both in the 
donor and in the recipient country. Public re-
source allocation criteria were established which 
reflected long-term socio-political options, such 
as promoting industrial development, providing 
basic social capital, introducing structural 
reforms and modernizing agriculture, saving 
foreign exchange and creating employment. 
These were criteria which the parliaments of the 
developed countries imposed upon their own 
States and their foreign aid and financing institu-
tions, and on the basis of which the State of the 
underdeveloped country negotiated, in so far as 
it too reflected long-term national interests. 
In their stead, market criteria correspond to 
the maximization of profits in the minimum 
possible length of time, to inequitable income 
distribution, to the consumer preferences of the 
high income groups and to the market strategies 
of the most powerful and dynamic national and 
transnational private groups. Here there is a dif-
ference of transcendental importance: govern-
ments and entrepreneurs have had great free-
dom to obtain and allocate vast quantities of 
external resources, but this increased freedom 
has not necessarily been to the advantage of the 
countries receiving that plentiful inflow of pri-
vate capital. Apart from the much heavier 
financial cost it represents, which has become a 
terrible burden because of the high interest 
rates, the problem lies firstly in the fact that when 
the governments concerned are not firmly 
committed to a development policy, the readily 
available supply of short-term external private 
financing takes the place of long-term external 
and internal saving and is deflected to consump-
tion, instead of helping to broaden and diversify 
production capacity; and secondly in that the 
market by itself is not the most appropriate 
instrument for channelling resources towards 
the development of a diversified production 
system, accompanied by social justice, and 
sustainable over the long term. 
In cases where the State continued to control 
the allocation of resources for development, in 
face of the abundance of external resources it 
often lost all sense of prudence and moderation 
and sank into a kind of financial fools' paradise, 
forgetting that real institutional and human ca-
pacity for rational utilization of financial re 
sources is limited, and that disproportionate 
short-term external borrowing is never a fit base 
for development strategy. In the petroleum-ex-
porting countries, another great mirage took the 
form of confusing structural adjustments in 
petroleum prices with a sustained long-term 
trend on which to base the wildest investment 
projects and a reckless boosting of consumption. 
It would seem that all these issues, fully discussed 
in the literature of development, were likewise 
forgotten in the great financial conjuring act of 
the 1970s. 
Transnational financial integration, the res-
toration of easy and ample access to the interna-
tional private financial system and the possibility 
of large-scale borrowing exerted strong pressure 
in favour of the adoption of policies of trade and 
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Financial openness and liberalization. When the 
political conflict between different coalitions is 
defined in these terms, the result is over-
expansion of imports of consumer goods and of 
the commercial and financial services sectors, 
and a reallocation of resources to the sectors with 
natural comparative advantages —including, in 
some countries, activities with advantages acqui-
red during the import substitution process. All 
this was accompanied by an attempt to consoli-
date the new hegemonic coalition: supported by 
international private financing, and under the 
leadership of the financial sector, exporters, 
importers and businessmen entered upon the 
scene with renewed vigour, seeking to take the 
place of the coalition formed by the industrial 
sectors, middle-income groups and working 
classes. There was a definite effort to reduce 
State intervention in order to leave the market 
—i.e., the main economic groups— to operate as 
freely as possible, an updating of laissez-faire 
policies and the whole market ideology of free 
exchange, static comparative advantages, private 
enterprise and individualism. All this of course 
with the energetic backing of the new transna-
tional centres of financial power. 
A recession in the central economies, less acute 
but more protracted than that of 1974-1975, has 
sufficed to answer the questions posed. In Chile 
and Mexico, in Argentina and Brazil, in Uruguay 
and Ecuador, the shortcomings of both mone-
tarism and developmentism have been exposed. 
Even in Colombia, a country which throughout 
the last decade pursued prudent policies, 
prompted by a healthy pragmatism, without suc-
cumbing to the allurements of the flag-waggers 
on either side, there is now outward and visible 
evidence of the vulnerability and the structural 
and socio-political weaknesses which are charac-
teristic of an underdeveloped and dependent 
economy, and which not even an admittedly rea-
sonable mix of developmentist and monetarist 
policies has been able to overcome. In a burst of 
groundless optimism, many had believed these 
In a commentary written on, the eve of the 
crisis the following questions were propounded 
in this connection: how long will the pendulum 
be stayed at the extreme of transnational finan-
cial integration on which the strategy of external 
openness is so decidedly based? How far can the 
already taut cord of private external borrowing 
be stretched, especially in view of trends towards 
stagnation and protectionism in the centres and 
their effects on peripheral exports? What limits 
are there to a strategy of economic growth with 
external openness essentially grounded on ex-
pansion of consumption of imports, of the finan-
cial and services sectors and of primary export 
activities? Has 1930 been forgotten? How can 
oil-importing countries keep up and even accen-
tuate a development style which encourages im-
ports in general, including imports of fuels, with 
real prices going up over the long term and with 
uncertain supplies? And, conversely, in the case 
of the petroleum-exporting countries, what 
would happen to such a strategy if fuel prices 
stopped rising? What will be the effects of this 
strategy on the diversification of the production 
system, on capital accumulation, on employment 
and on income distribution.4 
weaknesses to have been conquered or 
non-existent, on seeing that the Latin American 
economy continued to grow throughout the 
1970s despite the relative stagnation of the 
economy of the centres and the petroleum crisis. 
The structural problems of Latin America's 
development are well known. Although the 
growth rates of production, especially in the in-
dustrial sector, have been exceptionally high, 
urban and rural poverty is still present on a mas-
s é e O. Sunkel, "Comentarios sobre E. Bâcha y C. Díaz-
Alejandro: Mercados financieros: una visión desde la semipe-
riferia", in R. Ffrench-Davis (compiler), Las relaciones financie-
ras externas, su efecto en la economía latinoamericana, Mexico, 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, Serie Lecturas No. 47,1983, p. 
69. The foregoing pages are a revised version of this article. 
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sive scale, with, in shocking contrast, small is-
lands of extreme wealth; unemployment, under-
employment and marginality are widespread; 
social inequality and the concentration of income 
and wealth are enormous; and the degree of 
vulnerability, disequilibrium and external de-
pendence continues to be high. 
As regards the conjunctural situation, the 
figures are deplorable: a slump in production 
and real income for the first time in forty years; 
an appalling increase in unemployment, espe-
cially in the cities; gigantic external and internal 
debts; speeding-up of inflation; fiscal, monetary 
and external imbalances; growing social and 
political tensions and conflicts. Notwithstanding 
the heterogeneity of situations in the Latin 
American countries —large and small, more and 
less industrialized and urbanized, net importers 
and net exporters of petroleum— and the differ-
ences between them in respect of economic poli-
cy, the crisis affects all alike, although in varying 
degrees of intensity.5 
The generalized character of the crisis in 
Latin America has induced many, especially 
governments and those responsible for econom-
ic and financial policies, to regard it as of external 
origin (just as not many years ago they attributed 
the boom —brought about by virtue of 
exceptional external borrowing— to the wisdom 
of their internal policies). Blame is laid on the 
high interest rates that were engendered by the 
depressive monetarist policies introduced to-
wards the end of the Carter administration and 
were accentuated by the giant fiscal deficits built 
up under the Reagan régime, in combination 
with the rather original contribution of the 
"supply siders"; on the world recession and the 
contraction of international trade; on the dete-
rioration of the terms of trade; and on the 
drying-up of capital flows. 
But this does not account for the fact that 
althought the crisis is indeed generalized, it is no 
less true that its intensity and characteristics dif-
fer markedly from one country to another. For 
example, the steepest drops in production, in-
come and employment are observable chiefly in 
the countries of the Southern Cone and some 
5For the most recent detailed description, see Enrique 
V. Iglesias, "Preliminary overview of the Latin American 
economy during 1983", in this same issue oí the Review. 
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others which have faithfully adhered to the 
monetarist prescriptions and the stabilization 
programmes of the International Monetary 
Fund.6 This being so, even though the crisis may 
have a common external origin, there can be no 
doubt that its internal effects have been attenu-
ated or aggravated by the countries' own charac-
teristics, their previous development strategies 
and their policies for dealing with external prob-
lems. 
Nor does it explain another singularly sig-
nificant fact. As has already been pointed out, 
notwithstanding the frequent comparison of this 
crisis with that of 1929-1932, the two phenomena 
are not, up to now at least, very much alike. It is 
worth while briefly to recall that during the ear-
lier period the gross product of the main indus-
trial countries plummeted by about 20% between 
1929 and 1932, while total world imports shrank 
to one-third. Unemployment swelled to enor-
mous dimensions and nominal wages fell; but as 
prices declined by a similar proportion, real 
wages were maintained. Profits vanished into 
thin air and investment stopped dead. Money 
stocks were reduced, along with short-term in-
terest rates. The national and international 
financial system underwent a severe crisis; many 
banks failed in the United States and Europe; 
and governments had to intervene or abandon 
the gold standard.7 Between 1980 and 1983, on 
the other hand, although GDP and foreign trade 
witnessed a reduction in their rate of increase 
they did not significantly decrease in absolute 
terms. Unemployment, although high, does not 
approach the figures for the former period, and 
movements of prices and wages are very differ-
ent, as are also the characteristics of the financial 
system. 
What is more, in 1974 and 1975 a similar 
recession took place, without causing Latin 
America's economic policy the least headache. 
Why should it happen that now, in contrast with 
recent recessions and with the 1930 crisis, the 
centre has only to sneeze for the Latin American 
region of the periphery to suffer a heart attack? 
Why, it may also be asked, is this upheaval so 
explosive in Latin America, while its effects on 
"Ibid., table 2. 
7See Charles P. Kindleberger, The world in recession 
1929-1932, London, Allan Lane, the Penguin Press, 1973. 
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the other regions of the Third World are much 
less virulent? Why, on the other hand, does it 
seem to have got past the Iron Curtain, and had 
some impact on several countries in the socialist 
area? 
T o be able to answer these and other ger-
mane questions it is of fundamental importance 
to understand the nature of the crisis. In essence, 
two attitudes towards it are taken up. One main-
tains that it is just a recession, somewhat more 
protracted than is usual, in which unfortunately 
several coincident negative factors have com-
bined to produce particularly severe effects in 
Latin America, but that there are already signs of 
recovery in the United States; one must be pa-
tient and "adjust" until its positive effects begin 
to make themselves felt, for then will come a new 
phase of expansion that will alleviate the acute 
problems of today. 
Another very different view sees this as a 
deep-seated structural crisis, in which the reces-
sive and financial problems, as well as the more 
manifest disequilibria, are only symptoms which 
may easily be confused with a transient recession, 
but behind which in reality lies a profound and 
immensely far-reaching long-term crisis, whose 
outcome cannot be forecast with any certainty. It 
is essential to take up a position vis-à-vis these 
alternatives. In the first case, the appropriate 
strategy is to ride out the storm until it dies down, 
and to go ahead with the traditional develop-
ment strategies. In the second case, it is a matter 
of understanding that there is no such passing 
storm, but the tempestuous close of an expan-
sionist epoch or phase of capitalism, and that an 
attempt must be made to advance by new routes, 
learning from the lessons of the past, but not 
turning back, exploring new future options, and 
all this in a turbulent and difficult international 
context, very different from that prevailing in 
the first decade or two after the war. This is the 
alternative towards which the author of the pres-
ent study inclines, for reasons that will be set 
forth more fully below. 
Before attempting an interpretation of what 
I hold to be a deep-seated crisis of the post-war 
development style, which in my opinion calls for 
fundamen ta l changes in the deve lopment 
stategies of Latin America and entails powerful 
regional and Third World co-operation, I must 
refer to the economic reactivation or recovery 
which is taking place in the United States, and on 
which many authorities in the national and inter-
national economic and financial world are pin-
ning such high hopes. 
It is important to form a clear judgement of 
this phenomenon, for if it is confidently felt to be 
the beginning of a recovery which will subse-
quently draw the industrialized world in its wake 
to a new phase of sustained and dynamic expan-
sion, creating the right conditions for the Third 
World to enter upon a fresh spell of rapid 
growth, and therewith the requisites for lighten-
ing the heavy burden of external debt servicing, 
there might be some justification for short-term 
adjustment policies. If, on the other hand, the 
real outlook were not so flattering, the costs of 
persisting in adjustment policies and postponing 
radical changes in development strategy might 
be overwhelming 
In contradistinction to the optimistic dec-
larations of the national and international econ-
omic and financial authorities, eager to create an 
atmosphere of confidence, a review of the spe-
cialized press, and of some recent reports by 
international institutions, reveals little reliance 
on the durability of a short-term, still less of a 
medium- and long-term recovery, or on the 
possibility that the positive drive will be efr 
ficaciously transmitted to the Third World. 
Particularly significant are the recent dec-
larations of Mr. Fritz Leutwiler, President of the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). This 
bank, together with the International Monetary 
Fund, is the nearest thing there is to a world 
central bank. Apart from the fact that its annual 
reports carry indisputable authority, in recent 
years the Bank has been at the eye of the financial 
storm, actively participating with IMF in debt 
renegotiations between the biggest borrower 
countries and the leading creditor banks. 
In a recent address Mr. Leutwiler warned 
that it would be dangerous to assume that the 
industrial world is "about to enter an era of high 
and sustained growth", which is a prerequisite 
for any expansion of the developing countries' 
exports. "Anaemic economic growth in Western 
countries would annihilate the hopes of less de-
veloped countries to expand their exports to any 
significant degree", which means that the debt 
problem is likely to drag on for a long time and 
there is no alternative but to ask the banks to 
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continue helping countries to finance their 
debts. He added that "one should start looking 
for alternative ways to reduce the debt burden of 
developing nations". One possibility, he sug-
gested, was for the countries in question to "sell 
some of their national assets to their creditors. 
For those countries with large endowments of 
natural resources or profitable State-owned en-
terprises, this is certainly an option worth con-
sidering" (Financial Times, 5 December 1983, p. 
D.8 
These gloomy pronouncements coincide 
with those of various recent commentators and 
reports.9 First, it is acknowledged that the recov-
ery of the United States economy is very vigorous 
and that growth rates varying from 4.5 to 5.4% 
might be reached in 1984 (forecasts by OECD and 
the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, United Kingdom, respectively). Many 
commentators note, however, that the rate of 
recovery will slacken next year with the flagging 
of the initial drive generated by demand on the 
part of certain consumer expenditure sectors 
and by replenishment of inventories. They also 
think that the maintenance of high real interest 
rates, strengthened by enormous and persistent 
fiscal deficits and by the recovery itself, together 
with the weakness of other sectors of demand, 
part of which is filtered off towards imports 
favoured by an overvalued dollar, will hamper 
the recovery of investment, since there is a wide 
margin of idle capacity which is being taken up 
RThis is neither the time nor the place to discuss so 
disquieting a hint of mass transfer of the natural and public 
wealth of our countries as a means of attenuating external 
indebtedness, except for the purpose of drawing attention to 
the strategies which the international financial community 
may be exploring. Furthermore, it is logical to suppose that 
this process must already be taking place in the private sector, 
in which respect too it would behove us to keep our eyes open. 
^ h e next section is based mainly on the following docu-
mentation: Bank for International Settlements, Fifty-third 
Annual Report, Basle, June 1983; United Nations, World Eco-
nomic Survey 1983. Current trends and policies in the world eco-
nomy, New York, 1983; UNCTAD, Trade and development report, 
1983 (Part I. The current world economic crisis), September 
1983; Financial Times, "Financial Times Survey: Europe", 5 
December 1983; Anatole Kalestsky, "West Europe's econo-
mies: sink or swim together", Financial Times, 5 December 
1983, p. 16; International Herald Tribune, "Euromarkets, a 
special report", Part i and Part n, 28 and 29 November 1983, 
pp. 7-15 and 9-14, respectively. 
very slowly. In these circumstances, the initial 
impulse deriving from the expansion of consum-
er expenditure is not likely to result in an in-
crease in investment, and unless this were to re-
vive expansion could not be sustained. 
The vigorous United States recovery would 
not seem, however, to be reproducible in the 
other OECD countries. In several of the smaller 
countries and in France and Italy, monetary and 
fiscal policies will continue to be restrictive in 
view of heavy fiscal deficits, rates of inflation that 
are still high, shaky external accounts and pres-
sure on exchange rates, accentuated by the high 
United States interest rates and the strength of 
the dollar. The conservative governments of the 
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, too, have declared that they will go on 
pursuing their restrictive fiscal policies. 
With a more monetar is t approach , BIS 
reaches similar conclusions. It maintains that the 
progress already made in reducing inflation 
should itself foster recovery by setting afoot 
several processes: an increase in the real money 
supply, reduction of the real losses sustained by 
holders of financial assets, expansion of saving 
and the propensity to spend, capital gains, en-
trepreneurial confidence, a backlog of demand 
in respect of durable goods, housing, replenish-
ment of inventories and even investment. It 
points out, however, that these processes are 
highly sensitive to the level of interest rates, espe-
cially in real terms. In this sense it would seem 
that the progress made is insufficient. Although 
normal interest rates have come down, they have 
done so by less than the decline in inflation, par-
ticularly in the long-term market. Consequently, 
the real interest rate remains at levels that are 
historically high, especially for a period of reces-
sion. A major cause is to be found in the present 
and predicted United States budget deficits. If 
this situation remains unremedied, the risk will 
persist that the recovery will be aborted.10 Re-
cently Professor Martin S. Feldstein, Chairman 
of the Council of Economic Advisers to the Presi-
dent of the United States, fluttered the dorecotes 
by asserting that "it would be unwise to assume 
that growth alone will reduce the deficit to an 
'"Bank for International Settlements, Fifty-third..., op. 
cit., p. 31. 
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acceptable level" (International Herald Tribune, 6 
December 1983, p. 13). He added that if Con-
gress did not act soon to reduce the deficits, it ran 
the risk of plunging the United States economy 
back into recession (Ibid., 28 November 1983, p. 
10). 
The above-mentioned institutions predict a 
growth rate of 3.3% for the European economies 
in 1984, which seems decidedly hazardous in the 
light of the individual countries' situations, and 
in comparison with the 1.5% forecast by the 
European Economic Community. 
Forecasts suggest that unemployment will 
continue to increase in the ten EEC countries 
throughout the recovery, and even through the 
rosiest-coloured spectacles no significant effects 
on unemployment figures can be glimpsed 
ahead. Private economists who extend the 
analysis beyond 1984 do not think that the recov-
ery will become more marked in 1985, but rather 
that there is likely to be a fresh setback in 1986. 
Even if a significant recovery takes place, as 
the more encouraging forecasts suggest, it in no 
way guarantees immediate relief for the Third 
World countries. To that end, essential requisites 
are an expansion of demand for imported 
primary commodities and manufactures, wil-
lingness on the part of importers to increase their 
purchases and stocks, and an upward trend in 
the prices of the products in question in relation 
to exports from the industrial world (many of 
these tied to the.overvalued dollar). In turn, it 
will be necessary, inter alia, for the expansion of 
spending in the centres to be channelled towards 
sectors directly or indirectly using inputs from 
the Third World; for reactivation prospects to be 
sustained and for interest rates to fall, so that 
importers may have medium-term incentives to 
step up their purchases and replace inventories; 
for unemployment to be reduced so as to atte-
nuate protectionism; and for income and 
demand to be strengthened in the lower-income 
sectors. 
The difference between the rates of econ-
omic recovery in the United States and in the 
European economies is also of importance for 
the Third World, since the members of the 
European Economic Community, whose growth 
will be less, absorb almost one-fourth of total 
world imports (excluding intra-Community 
trade) while the United States accounted for only 
15% in 1980. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the prospects 
of the recovery's being reflected over the short 
term in significant increases in demand and 
prices for the primary commodities, food 
products and manufactures exported by the un-
derdeveloped countries look very doubtful, es-
pecially if the recovery, as everything seems to 
suggest, has little likelihood of being maintained. 
What is more, the underdeveloped world, 
far from contributing to the recovery as it has 
done in the past, helps to limit it. The suspension 
of the flow of private external financing into 
these countries on account of their heavy exter-
nal indebtedness, the insufficiency of official 
financing to stabilize the balance of payments, 
the reduction of external aid and the deteriora-
tion in the value of exports, besides substantial 
losses of reserves, have compelled many coun-
tries to adopt stricter austerity policies and to 
compress their imports severely, and this has 
strengthened deflationary pressures in the in-
dustrial countries.11 
To the prospect of a relatively ephemeral 
recovery must be added another factor with 
potentially explosive short-term repercussions, 
which may help to prolong stagnation over the 
medium and long term: the highly delicate inter-
national financial situation. 
A political and strategic factor at the interna-
tional level, which is undoubtedly causing far 
greater concern to the United States and Europe 
than the economic and financial crisis, is the 
sensation of standing on the threshold of a direct 
or indirect armed confrontation between the su-
perpowers, in the strategic fields of Europe, the 
Middle East, Central America and the Carib-
bean. Almost ludicrous though it may seem to 
speak of any of the economic consequences of a 
war of incalculable projections, two at least can-
not but be mentioned. Firstly, on the one hand, 
the fear of an armed conflict encourages the 
purchase of dollars for security reasons, which 
weakens European balance-of-payments posi-
tions and supports the trend towards overvalua-
" T h e current value of Latin American imports has 
shrunk by almost one half between 1981 and 1983: from US$ 
90 billion to US$ 56 billion (see Enrique V. Iglesias', Prelimin-
ary overview..., op. cit., table 1). 
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tion of the dollar, enlarging the United States 
trade deficit and intensifying protectionist pres-
sures. On the other hand, there is a prospect of 
further increases in United States military 
budgets and of the maintenance of the inordi-
nate fiscal deficit and the high interest rates. It is 
a remarkable paradox that Europe, which will be 
the first victim of a flare-up of hostilities, is help-
ing to finance this policy. 
A second factor is uncertainty with respect to 
the stability of the international banking and 
financial system. William R. Cline, a recognized 
specialist in this field, estimates that if Brazil were 
to declare a moratorium for a specific period half 
the profits of the nine leading United States 
banks would be wiped out, which would precipi-
tate a run on the banks and would compel the 
Federal Reserve Bank to support them. Even if it 
did not entirely eliminate profits or seriously 
affect capital in most cases, it would undoubtedly 
be a severe blow to the economy. The incentives 
for debtors to "walk away from their obligations" 
are increasing: in 1982 the interest paid by the 
non-petroleum-exporting developing countries 
(US$ 59.2 billion) exceeded net inflows of capital 
(US$ 57.4 billion). The same writer describes the 
situation as one of "an underlying structural vul-
nerability in international lending" {International 
Herald Tribune, 28 November 1983, p. 9). The 
defaulting crises of Mexico and Brazil, during 
their crucial phases, sharply reduced the value of 
the shares of the banks most deeply involved and 
obliged the United States Treasury to mount 
rescue operations to avert the risk of a run on the 
banks and the failure of some of them. The Presi-
dent of BIS remarked, in the address quoted 
above, that while the financial world was much 
better prepared than a year ago to handle a possi-
ble default, this was still something that could not 
be ruled out. He was no doubt referring to the 
emergency renegotiation operations which had 
been organized and to the intolerable pressures 
to which the governments of the debtor coun-
tries have been subjected by the International 
Monetary Fund, and which have caused the sta-
bility of more than one to totter. 
The delicacy of the international political 
and financial situation has its internal repercus-
sions in the creditor countries themselves. The 
authorities controlling the United States banks 
currently record the largest number of financial 
institutions in danger of bankruptcy since the 
1930s. The Federal Deposits Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) considers that more than 600 
banks are at risk of failure, and the authorities 
were expecting that number to increase before 
the end of 1983 {International Herald Tribune, 26-
27 November 1983, p. 11). Two recent reports, 
one from the Treasury Department and one 
from the House Ways and Means Committee, 
state that the two most important bank control 
institutions —the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Federal Bank and FDIC— are incapable of 
detecting potencial bank crises and enforcing 
preventive and remedial measures. The Nation-
al Bank of Switzerland is to request five new sets 
of informational data from the banks, including 
details on their external activities, this latter on 
account of the international financial crisis which 
has shown that effective supervision of the inter-
national banks is impossible if their external sub-
sidiaries are not taken into account {Ibid., 30 
November 1983, p. 13). And this in a country 
where there are no cases of banks overinvolved 
in loans to heavily indebted countries, a state of 
affairs which the Swiss bankers themselves attri-
bute, of course, to the strict provisions regarding 
capital assets coefficients with which they have to 
comply {Ibid., 29 November 1983, p. 12). 
And it must not be forgotten that the dis-
placement of governments committed in the 
1970s to the monetarist policy of external open-
ness, and of their technical cadres linked with the 
transnational banks and responsible for the im-
mense external debt and its consequences, will 
imply significant changes in these countries' 
bargaining position. Not unconnected with this 
concern is the attention devoted by the interna-
tional press to the recent elections in Argentina 
and Venezuela, and the satisfaction expressed 
that in both cases ample democratic majorities 
were obtained. This would make it possible for 
the new presidents to impose severe austerity 
policies "acceptable to the international banks" 
{Financial Times, 6 December 1983, p. 18). Here 
the dilemma posed at the beginning of the pre-
sent article appears in its crudest guise: it is 
hoped that these new presidents will govern in 
accordance with the interests of the international 
banks, which certainly do not coincide with the 
needs of the peoples who elected them. 
The nerves of the world financial authorities 
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are on edge and public opinion in the countries 
in question is by no means willing to see their tax 
payers helping to subsidize rash and irresponsi-
ble bankers while they themselves are subjected 
to austerity policies which reduce employment 
and social services. The same view is taken by the 
small and medium-sized banks, which put up 
much of the external financing of the big banks 
through syndicated loans, and which are now 
involved in the renegotiation processes being 
carried out by those that are the most deeply 
committed. The Michigan National Bank is 
suing the City Bank in a legal battle which is 
being watched with the keenest attention by in-
ternational banks throughout the world. Michi-
gan National is challenging City Bank's decision 
to effect a rollover of its share in a loan to Pemex 
without its consent. This is the first case of its type 
in recent years, and its settlement could have 
important repercussions on the viability of many 
In my exploration of this field I shall seek the 
company of several authorities, seeing to it that 
they represent a broad ideological spectrum. 
According to Paul Samuelson, Nobel Prize win-
ner in Economics, whose position is well in the 
centre of the doctrinal gamut, no one can con-
fidently predict the future; but after careful con-
sideration he thinks the last quarter of the twen-
tieth century will show a rate of economic prog-
ress far below that attained in the third quarter. 
Within the Marxist tradition, one of its most 
outstanding representatives, Professor Ernest 
Mandei, by the early 1970s already saw in the 
1974-1975 recession one of the recurrent crises 
of the capitalist system, characterized since the 
mid-1960s by a decline in the profitability of 
enterprises in consequence of a twofold process 
of overaccumulation of capital and undercon-
sumption. The boom phase of the lengthy cycle 
which the system is experiencing at present 
i ; î
"The world economy at century's end",Japan Economic 
Journal, 10 March 1983. 
recent debt renegotiations (Ibid., p. 21). 
In short, the national and international 
financial world gives the impression of a mine-
field into which the chief protagonists —banks, 
international financial institutions, govern-
ments— are venturing with more equipment in 
the way of experience and devices to detect and 
temporarily defuse the mines and to look after 
the wounded when they stumble against one. But 
as yet there are no signs of any real effort to 
mount a systematic cleaning-up operation. 
Attention is focused on the very short term. The 
banks and governments of the industrial coun-
tries and their chief agent —the International 
Monetary Fund— want to lay on the debtor 
countries the whole burden of the cost of adjust-
ment, subjecting them to intolerable economic, 
social and political demands, and all this in the 
hope that on the road to recovery the loads will 
be accommodated. 
would seem to have come to an end in 1967, 
when a long recessive phase began.13 
The third quotation, from a conservative 
standpoint, comes from the BIS document 
already cited on several occasions. "The process 
of disinflation upon which the Western indus-
trial world had embarked in the wake of the 
second oil crisis... has been accompanied, at least 
until recently, by stagnation of output in the in-
dustrial world as a whole. It is probable that the 
wrong policy mix, i.e., the excessive burden 
borne by monetary policy in imposing global res-
traint, made the stagnation more protracted 
than it would otherwise have been. And it is 
certain that by exerting upward pressure on in-
terest rates the policy mix has had a particularly 
inhibiting influence on capital formation, thus 
mortgaging future growth potencial. But one 
should forget that the Western industrlial coun-
l:iSee Late capitalism, London, New Left Books, 1975; 
The second slump: a marxist analysis of recession in the seventies, 
London, New Left Books, 1978. 
IV 
The exhaustion of the transnational growth style 
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tries' growth problems did not begin three years 
ago, when they jointly undertook to resist the 
cost-push of the second oil shock. The first signs 
of a break in growth trends, at least as far as fixed 
capital investment is concerned, were evident in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, well before the 
first oil shock. The deeper-seated causes of the 
break remain uncertain, but the more immediate 
ones are not: the rising share of labour in income 
distribution, the declining profitability of 
businesses, the expanding role of the public sec-
tor, sluggish capital formation and weakening 
productivity growth. 
"Nor should one attribute the current level 
of unemployment exclusively to the demand-
restraining policies of the last three years. Unem-
ployment, particularly in Western Europe, was 
on an upward trend well before that, under the 
combined influence of slower growth, an ex-
panding population and in some countries in-
creases in the labour-force participation rates. 
Last but not least, the excessive rise in real wage 
costs and growing impediments to labour mobil-
ity gave a major incentive to labour-saving invest-
ment and innovations. It is against this back-
ground that the recent declines in real wages, 
beyond their direct contribution to slowing infla-
tion, are a helpful element of adjustment."14 
The exceptional post-war boom began to 
fade out by the end of the 1960s (see table 3). In 
all the industrialized countries productivity in-
creased from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. 
This trend was reversed in almost all cases in the 
second quinquennium of the 1960s, after which 
a slight recovery was shown in some countries in 
the early 1970s, to be followed in the rest of the 
decade by a slump. This decline in productivity 
towards the end of the 1960s was also reflected in 
such indicators as the profitability of enterprises, 
the decrease in the rate of capital formation and 
the increase in unemployment. Most of the 
analyses of the period, which are based on trends 
in the gross product and in foreign trade, over-
look that essential turning-point, since those in-
dicators, after a reduction in the years 1970 and 
1971, made a vigorous recovery in 1972 and 
1973. Accordingly, many analysts of the crisis 
take the year 1973 as a major milestone, which in 
the present writer's opinion introduces a serious 
HSee Bank for International Settlements, op. cit., pp. 
3-4. 
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Source: Herbert Giersch and Frank Wolter, "Towards an Explanation of the 
Productivity Slowdown: An Acceleration-Deceleration Hypothesis", in The 
Economic Journal, 93, March 1983, table 1, p. 36. 
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bias into the analysis, by attributing the end of 
the post-war era of expansion implicitly and 
often explicitly to the oil crisis. The fact that the 
process of stagnation had begun by the mid-
1960s is thus lost sight of.15 
In order to see this phenomenon in a clearer 
light, it should be fitted into a broader historical 
framework (see table 4). This throws into relief 
something which economists had forgotten, or 
which, with their characteristic arrogance, they 
thought had been overcome by the progress and 
perfecting of economic policy: the irregular, cy-
clical nature of capitalist development, not only 
over the short and medium but also over the long 
term. It can be seen that from the beginning of 
the nineteenth century to our own time capitalist 
development has passed through several 
protracted phases of expansion and stagnation 
of production, per capita income, productive 
fixed capital formation and exports (see table 4). 
15This phenomenon is well documented. See H. Giersch 
and F. Wolter, "Towards an explanation of the productivity 
slowdown: an acceleration-deceleration hypothesis"; A. 
Lindbeck, "The recent slowdown of productivity growth"; 
and E.F. Denison, "The interruption of productivity growth 
in the United States", all in Economic Journal, 93 (March 1983). 
See also D.M. Leipziger, "Productivity in the United States 
and its international implications", The World Economy, Vol. 3, 
No. l . J u n e 1980; T.P. Hill, Profits and rates of return, Paris, 
1979; S. Rosenberg and T.E. Weisskopf, "A conflict theory 
approach to inflation in the postwar US economy", American 
Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 2,1981; OECD, Economic Outlook, 
December 1978. 
The first phase of expansion lasted almost a 
century, up to 1913; then supervened a long 
wave of recession between 1913and 1950; nexta 
new and very marked expansionist cycle follo-
wed, between 1950 and 1973; and later still, bet-
ween 1973 and 1979, came the dawn of what 
would appear to be a new and long-drawn-out 
phase of recession. This last period really began 
several years before, and the last few years 
should also be added, making up a period of 
about 15 years of relative stagnation. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that there should have 
been a revival of Kondratieff s theory of long 
waves or cycles.16 Does this last period really 
constitute the beginning of a lengthy phase of 
stagnation, or is it merely a matter of taking a 
deep breath, or heaving several profound sighs, 
before resuming the noteworthy rate of 
expansion characteristic of the period following 
the War? To decide this point, it is necessary to 
examine the nature of that extraordinary phase 
of expansion and to see whether the conditions 
on which it was based still exist or have 
l6See, for example, Angus Maddison, Phases of capitalist 
development, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 
1982; W.W. Rostov, "Kondratieff, Schumpeter and Kuznets: 
trend periods revisited", in Journal of Economic History, De-
cember 1975, and his book The world economy, London, Mac-
millan, 1978. See also Mandei, op. cit., and the special number 
of Futures (Vol. 13, No. 4, August 1981) on "Technical in-
novation and long waves in world economic development", 
edited by Christopher Freeman. 
Table 4 
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 Average for 13 countries. 
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disappeared. To that end, I shall examine some 
aspects of the evolution of the primary factors of 
production (human, natural, capital and 
energy), of the state of the productive forces and 
their technological base, and of the national 
socio-political organization and its international 
context, 
As regards productive resources, it should be 
recalled that the labour force has increased sig-
nificantly in the developed countries, as a result 
of the population explosion recorded in the Uni-
ted States after the Second World War and the 
immigration into Europe, especially into West 
Germany, of the displaced population of the 
countries of Eastern Europe. Subsequently, this 
manpower contingent went on expanding in the 
North Atlantic economy in consequence of im-
migration from the European and United States 
periphery, the "Gastarbeiter" phenomenon in 
Europe, and the quotas of Mexican, Central 
American and Caribbean immigrants in the 
United States. 
With respect to raw materials, investment in 
mineral, energy and agricultural resources was 
rapidly renewed after the Second World War in 
view of the prospects of expansion of United 
States and, later on European and Japanese de-
mand, both for the purposes of reconstruction of 
these economies and to supply the demand de-
riving from the cold war and from hostilities such 
as those in Korea and other subsequent conflicts. 
A factor of importance in facilitating this invest-
ment was the gradual dismantling of the Euro-
pean colonial empires in Asia, Africa and the 
Caribbean, which opened up these countries to 
United States, German and Japanese invest-
ment. 
Where capital infrastructure was concerned, 
the United States economy had not succeeded in 
fully utilizing its accumulated productive capaci-
ty until the last stage of the Second World War. 
And this tempo of activity was not recovered 
until the end of the 1940s. 
This incorporation of relatively idle factors 
of production into the economic process was pos-
sible thanks to an exceptional expansion of glo-
bal demand. It was manifested mainly in the 
resumption of military expenditure on rearma-
ment in consequence of the start of the cold war 
as from 1948, the Point IV programme to sup-
port the development of the less developed 
countries, the Marshall Plan for the reconstruc-
tion of the European countries devastated by the 
War, the creation of the European Common 
Market, the introduction of a set or redistribu-
tion and full employment policies, as part of the 
conception of the Welfare State, and the genera-
lization of the United States life style and con-
sumer patterns in the European countries and 
Japan at first, and later among the privileged 
sectors in the rest of the world. 
The logistic support for the establishment of 
the political, military and economic hegemony of 
the United States was, moreover, one of the chief 
sources of the extension of the great United 
States oligopolical corporations to the rest of the 
developed and underdeveloped world, or, in 
other words, one of the bases on which the trans-
national enterprise was able to expand at world 
level until in time itcontributed to the generation 
of the transnational system. 
The sustained expansion of demand and of 
internal and international markets, the utiliza-
tion of accumulated production capacity and the 
enlargement of scales of production in the big 
multinational corporations, the introduction of 
technological innovations deriving from the 
Second World War and from the nuclear and 
space race of the post-war decades, together with 
the mass adoption of United States vanguard 
technology in the European and Japanese econo-
mies, made possible a striking increase in capital 
formation, radical changes in the structure of 
production, economies of scale, agglomeration 
and conglomeration, and improvements in pro-
ductive efficiency, with a marked upswing in the 
productivity of labour. Behind all this a major 
contributing factor was the low price and gra-
dually increasing cheapness of petroleum, the 
source of energy which came to be predominant 
in the post-war economy. This new energy base 
in process of expansion facilitated the increase in 
labour productivity by promoting the rapid and 
mass substitution of capital equipment for man-
power. This was reflected, furthermore, in 
greater dynamism in those sectors of the 
economy that were most directly linked to the 
utilization of so exceptionally versatile and cheap 
a source of energy: the motor-vehicle industry, 
the metal-working and electronics industries 
producing durable consumer goods, the 
petrochemical industry, and the artificialization 
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of agriculture (mechanization, chemical inputs, 
artificial climate and conservation). 
This combination of factors was favourable 
to a highly oligopolized economic structure, in 
which the dynamics of competition between the 
great transnational corporations was increasing-
ly channelled into rapid innovations in technol-
ogy and design, differentiation of output, and 
inordinate promotion of consumption and man-
ipulation of the consumer, through scientific 
publicity and sales techniques as well as the 
almost unlimited extension of consumer credits: 
all this based on a veritable revolution in 
communications.17 The levels and patterns of 
consumption of individuals, families and society 
as a whole became their central social objectives 
and values, determining their social status within 
the national framework and in the international 
system. The demonstration effect came to be the 
lode star of social aspirations both among 
countries and among the social classes in a single 
country, and the development criterion and 
ideology of national growth and "moderniza-
tion", taking this to mean the assimilation and 
reproduction of the behaviour patterns, values, 
consumption, technology, social and even insti-
tutional and political organization characteristic 
of the industrialized countries and in particular 
of the United States. 
In the case of Latin America this interpreta-
tion of development policy took formal shape in 
the Alliance for Progress. The idea, in essence, 
was to promote economic growth by means of 
major transport, communications and energy in-
frastructure projects, in order to facilitate in-
dustrial development, the modernization of agri-
culture (including its institutional transforma-
tion through agrarian reform) and urbanization, 
which, together with the expansion of general 
and higher education, were aimed at building up 
large urban middle classes; these, by sharing the 
life style, consumer patterns and values of the 
developed world, would be the pillars of an 
economic development of capitalist character 
under a democratic political system, closely 
linked to the North Atlantic alliance. 
As has been noted, the exceptional dyna-
mism of this economic growth style of the indus-
l7See F.M. Scherer, Industrial market structure and econo-
mic performance, Chicago, Rand Mc Nally, 1971. 
trialized countries began to slacken at the end of 
the 1960s. The reasons are of various kinds. In 
the first place, during the period analysed, and 
especially in its early phases, there were certain 
initial conditions and factors and unique 
phenomena that were irreproducible, such as the 
existence of idle capacity in the United States 
economy, European reconstruction, the 
integration of Europe, industrial and 
agricultural modernization, especially in Europe 
and Japan, and the liberalization of international 
trade, all of which helped to stimulate expansion, 
but once their possibilities were exhausted 
disappeared from the scene. 
Another group of factors served as driving 
forces up to a point, but in so far as their use was 
extended beyond certain limits they changed 
from positive to negative and began to turn into 
constraints on expansion. Cases in point were the 
increasing costs for the State of financing gigan-
tic military set-ups and performing income redis-
tribution and social welfare functions, and the 
rise in the real cost of labour deriving from full 
employment policies and the strengthening of 
the trade unions' bargaining power. These were 
at first factors making for the expansion of de-
mand, but when certain levels were exceeded 
they resulted in a reduction of the profitability of 
enterprises and in inflationary pressures, either 
on account of the fiscal deficit or because of 
increased taxation. 
T h e e x p a n s i o n of fore ign inves tment 
through the transnational corporations also en-
joyed an extremely dynamic and positive phase, 
but the time came when high real costs of labour, 
heavy taxation and environmental protection re-
quirements meant that the profitability of the 
subsidiaries surpassed that of the parent firms. 
These latter began to transfer their operations 
en masse to other countries, developed, under-
developed and even socialist, not only to broaden 
their markets, but, what was more, to re-export 
from them to their countries of origin, ousting 
traditional activities in the process of generating 
unemployment problems.18 
Another phenomenon of this type is the 
rapid reconstruction, modernization and excep-
tional dynamism of the European and Japanese 
18See F. Frõbel, J. Heinricks, O. Kreye, Die neue interna-
tionale Arbeitsteilung, Reinbek bei Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1977. 
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economies, which at first contributed to the eco-
nomic expansion of the industrialized centre, but 
which as time went by began to cause friction 
among the countries forming it with the inten-
sification of competition among the European 
countries, between these and the United States 
and between Japan and all the rest. Trade def-
icits were thus generated in the less competitive 
countries, which adopted restrictive and protec-
tionist policies, thereby cramping not only their 
own expansion, but also that of the more dy-
namic countries, and indirectly that of the less 
developed countries and in the last analysis of the 
entire world economy. 
A similar case was that of the developing 
countries which diversified and expanded their 
exports of non-traditional items and manufac-
tures and began to gain a foothold in the markets 
of the industrial countries; in so far as they multi-
plied, grew and were successful, they created 
problems of equivalent activities in the industrial 
countries, which provoked the corresponding 
protectionist reaction. 
The increasing United States trade deficit 
generated by these differential trends in produc-
tivity and international competition, and aggra-
vated by military, external aid and foreign invest-
ment commitments and by such events as the 
hostilities in Vietnam, finally led to the relin-
quishment of the dollar/gold standard in August 
1971. This marked the collapse of the system of 
international economic institutions established at 
Bretton Woods, with the dollar as a reserve cur-
rency, on the basis of the fact that at the end of 
the War the United States possessed a gold re-
serve much larger than that of all the other coun-
tries put together. By virtue of the process de-
scribed above, this situation underwent a radical 
change. In 1950 the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy and Japan together possessed a re-
serve of US$ 1.4 billion which by 1970 had in-
creased to almost US$ 24 billion; United States 
reserves in the same period dropped from 
US$ 24 billion to US$ 14.5 billion, and went on 
rapidly falling. 
As the vulnerability of the dollar became in-
creasingly patent, a number of speculative man-
oeuvres against the existing parities were initi-
ated, facilitated by the elimination of exchange 
controls in Europe and the rapid expansion of 
the Eurocurrencies market, in which it was easy 
to obtain credit for speculative purposes. The 
agreement reached in December 1971 on the 
management of exchange adjustments was 
annulled in 1973, inasmuch as fixed parities 
were no longer possible in face of the creation of 
an international financial market which facili-
tated speculation. Once again an expansionist 
process of trade and financial liberalization took 
place, which in a world of fixed and foreseeable 
parities had facilitated international trade and 
investment during a given period, but which in 
face of growing real imbalances among the mem-
ber countries and the re-creation and vast expan-
sion of an uncontrollable transnational private 
financial market fell a prey to speculative insta-
bility. The introduction of fluctuating exchange 
rates brought permanent instability into the sys-
tem, and with it uncertainty and extreme caution 
in respect of productive investment, especially of 
a long-term character. 
The energy crisis might be regarded as an 
exogenous shock which had an impact on the 
situation at two key points of time: 1973-1974 
and 1979. But from a longer-term standpoint we 
have been formulating the hypothesis that this 
was one of those virtuous circles which become 
vicious circles in the course of time. Because of 
the United States' exceptional resource endow-
ments and its relative shortage of manpower, it 
had tended ever since the last century to adopt 
capital-intensive technologies. The plentifulness 
of oil resources, and the price and other advan-
tages of this fuel, encouraged its widespread use 
and dissemination in the motor-vehicle and pet-
rochemical industries and in the manufacture of 
electrical household appliances. Hence was en-
gendered the development style described 
above, based, inter alia, on intensive utilization of 
this source of energy, and, in genera!, of all the 
natural resources and environmental conditions 
which were exceptionally abundant in the Unit-
ed States. With the transnationalization process 
this style was generalized throughout the world, 
whereby demand for petroleum expanded to an 
inordinate extent and became increasingly in-
elastic as it was to a greater or lesser extent in-
corporated in patterns of technology, of produc-
tion, of consumption, of territorial organization 
and of human settlements in all countries, in-
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eluding those lacking in oil.19 Thus it was that the 
petroleum-exporting countries realized that spe-
cific geopolitical circumstances had been created 
which allowed them to form a cartel and fix 
prices at a much higher level. 
Whatever the interpretation of this phe-
nomenon, its effects on the international econ-
omy have been of the greatest importance. In 
the first place, it has caused a structural costs 
inflation effect on account of the restriction of 
supplies of a basic input; secondly, it has ren-
dered obsolete a considerable proportion of the 
fixed capital structures whose operation de-
pended upon petroleum, with the consequent 
capital losses; and in addition it has considerably 
enlarged the deficits on current account of the 
petroleum-importing countries. At the same 
time it contributed to the formation of the trans-
national banking system and the infusion of a 
formidable mass of liquidity of some US$ 2 000 
billion into the international economic system 
during the past decade. This was a means of 
preventing an even worse recession, but it helped 
to generate very strong additional inflationary 
pressures, especially as a result of the 1979 oil 
crisis. Hence a new direction was given to econo-
mic policy: the economic growth and full em-
ployment targets adopted after the Second 
" 'The hypothesis set forth can be applied, with the 
appropriate reservations, to other non-renewable as well as to 
renewable natural resources, and particularly to certain 
ecosystems of critical significance for human survival in speci-
fic localities. This subject has been explored in recent years by 
the Joint ECLA/UNEP Development and Environment Unit in a 
number of studies: Estilos de desarrollo y medio ambiente en la 
América Latina, selection by O. Sunkel and N. Gligo, Serie 
Lecturas No. 36, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1980; O. Sunkel, La dimensión ambiental en los estilos de desarrollo 
de América Latina, E/CEPAÜC. 1143, Santiago, ECLA/UNEP, 1981; 
N. Gligo, "Estilos de desarrollo, modernización y medio 
ambiente en la agricultura latinoamericana", in Estudios e 
Informes de la CEPAL No. 4, E/CEPAL/G. 1117, Santiago, 
ECLA/UNEP, 1981; "Estilos de desarrollo de la industria 
manufacturera y medio ambiente en América Latina", in 
Estudios e Informes de la CEPAL NO. 11, E/CEPAL/G.1 196, 
Santiago, ECLA/UNEP, 1982; "Informe del seminario regional 
sobre metropolizactón y medio ambiente", E/CEPA L/I.. 266, 
Santiago, 1982; "Estilos de desarrollo, energía y medio 
ambiente: un estudio de caso exploratorio", in Estudios e 
Informes de la CEPAL N O . 28, E/CEPAL/G. 1254, Santiago, 
ECLA/UNEP, July 1983; Expansión de la frontera agropecuaria y 
medio ambiente en América Latina, CEPAL/CIFCA, Madrid, 1983; 
Sobrevivencia campesina en ecosistemas de altura, E/CEPAIA;. 1267, 
Santiago, ECLA/UNEP (in the press). 
World War were abandoned, and every effort 
was concentrated on counteracting inflation and 
restoring basic systemic equilibria through a 
90 
monetarist purge. 
Economic stagnation and growing unem-
ployment, increasingly intensive inflationary 
pressures and the contradictions deriving from a 
succession of short-term policies designed to 
"warm up" and "cool down" the economy time 
and again, were reflected in greater social ten-
sions and subsequently led to the breakdown of 
the coalition between capital, the middle-income 
sectors and labour, which was the political cor-
nerstone of the Welfare State and of the Keynes-
ian policies of full employment and expansion 
of consumption that characterized the pro-
longed post-war boom. What was possible in a 
period of expansion, when the struggle for redis-
tribution was taking place in a situation in which 
everyone could gain, became impossible in a 
situation of stagnation, when the gains of some 
were obtained at the expense of the rest. It seems 
to me that this fundamental political fact —the 
disruption of a broad social and political consen-
sus which extended from organized labour to the 
entrepreneurial sectors, and included the large 
middle-income strata of professionals, techni-
cians and employees of public and private 
bureaucracy— is what lies behind the resurgence 
of a highly reactionary position on the political 
right wing (and of a thoroughgoing revolution-
ary one on the left). 
The reactionary position has two major man-
ifestations: the use of the monetarist model as a 
macroeconomic explanation, and, more essential 
still, the philosophico-ideological return to the 
classic traditions of Adam Smith's capitalism, 
that is, a radical revaluation of individualism. 
Society is not made up of social aggregates —clas-
ses, groups— but of individuals; everything can 
and must be interpreted in supply, demand and 
market terms, be it law, the State, society, family 
life or marriage: to everything can and must be 
applied the economic cost-benefit analysis. All 
this comes to constitute an ideology, a political 
programme, in which an attempt is made to dis-
mantle the State apparatus as far as possible. The 
Welfare State system is severely pruned because 
20Bank for International Settlements, Fifty-third Annual 
..., op. cit. 
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it interferes with each individual's decision as to 
what he must do with his income; State interven-
tion in respect of investment is also restricted; 
and the weight carried by the State in terms of 
taxation and in particular of income tax is re-
duced, in order to demolish a system which dep-
rives the individual of incentives.21 
Other necessary steps are to destroy the 
trade union organizations in order to forestall 
artificial interference in the labour market; to 
strip the State of all enterprises and activities that 
can be privatized; and, of course, not only to 
apply the principle of laissez-faire in internal 
affairs, but also to promote total openness of the 
national economy to the world economy, so that 
the domestic price system is regulated by the 
international price system to ensure that static 
comparative advantages determine resource 
allocation. 
In macroeconomic terms, the monetarist 
model consists essentially in liberalizing the 
financial market to the greatest possible extent, 
eliminating the Fiscal deficit and strictly limiting 
monetary expansion so that the rate of interest 
may reach its "true" real level, and may serve as 
the chief instrument for encouraging saving and 
allocating investment resources. As long as these 
monetarist policies were applied in industrial 
countries of secondary importance in the inter-
national system, and in underdeveloped coun-
tries, the world economy was not affected. But 
It is very possible that this diagnosis may be mis-
taken. But I am in good company. 
"The 1980s and 1990s are likely to be de-
cades of profound change: changes in the tech-
nological sphere, with massive introduction of 
computers and the increasing use of robots in the 
production system; changes in the energy field, 
2IA good summary, with neoliberal leanings, is to be 
found in H. Lapage, Mañana, el capitalismo, Alianza Editorial, 
1979. See also P. Dews, "The nouvelle philosophie and 
Foucault", in Economy and Society, Vol. 8, No. 2, May 1979, in 
relation to the critique of the Welfare State. 
when this programme began to be implemented 
in the United States economy, nominal and real 
interest rates shot up to extremely high levels, 
not only in that country but throughout the 
world, whereas they had been barely positive 
since the War. Thus the recession was exacer-
bated and prolonged, investment, particularly 
long-term investment, being restricted, and in 
many countries the problem of the external and 
internal debt reached boiling-point. 
In the upshot, this attempt at an interpreta-
tion of the evolution of the international econ-
omy after the War would seem to suggest that 
the phase of dynamic expansion had come to an 
end by 1970, as a result of the disappearance, 
exhaustion and reversal of a number of long-
term forces, which were in operation during the 
period in question and since then have not been 
replaced. During the 1970s the political and 
energy bases that supported the development 
style in question collapsed, and for a conception 
of economic policy directed towards growth and 
full employment was substituted another cen-
tred on monetary and financial stability at both 
the national and the international level. Thus a 
period of serious instability, uncertainty and con-
fusion was generated in both national and inter-
national economic policies, which have culmi-
nated in an acute and prolonged recession, 
superimposed upon the long-term structural 
crisis of the style. 
where oil will be replaced by other sources of 
energy; changes in consumer tastes and their 
repercussions on consumption patterns; changes 
in the international environment, especially with 
the increasing competitiveness of newly indus-
trialized countr ies; and, last but not least, 
changes in the financial and internat ional 
monetary system brought about by the increas-
ing disorder of recent years. 
"During most of the post-war period the ECE 
market economies have shown their adaptability 
to changing patterns of production and con-
sumption; however, this was essentially achieved 
V 
A future without reactivation 
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under conditions of relatively rapid economic 
growth. One of the main questions for the com-
ing years is whether, in the present sluggish econ-
omic environment, these countries will be able 
to adapt their economies smoothly to the changes 
foreseen and whether, under the acute pressure 
of current problems —like very high unemploy-
ment rates— short-term policies may postpone 
or at least slow down the pace of the necessary 
structural changes. ... 
"A further general conclusion of the present 
study is that low economic growth and high de-
velopment levels seem to increase the rigidities of 
the sectoral structures of production and em-
ployment. In the currently prevailing economic 
environment, these rigidities may imply a long 
transition period ... in making the necessary 
structural adaptations."22 
An eminent specialist in technology remarks 
that "the stock of inventions and innovations now 
at hand does not give the impression that they 
could furnish the needed impulse for rapid 
growth in the developed countries in the period 
ahead. The experience of the 1970s has under-
lined that the structural changes which had 
served to cushion the impact of deceleration also 
seem to have exhausted their resilience. Nor are 
the longer-term social aspects (management of 
enterprises in the economy, an easy to achieve 
balance between conflicting social interests, a 
better distribution of income and reduction of 
working hours) being handled so as to offer the 
much needed impulse".23 
Maddison's excellent and comprehensive 
study concludes that the expansionist "golden 
age" of the post-war decades came to an end in 
1973, and that we are entering upon a new era 
which is structurally different from the period 
1950-1970. T h e following would appear to be 
the most deep-seated causes: changes in econom-
ic policy, where the commitment to maintain 
high and stable levels of demand has faded out 
and the dominant influence has become that of 
monetarism, which as a pre-Keynesian economic 
2aUnited Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
Structural changes and analysis of labour productivity in the ECE 
market economies and some implications for future economic growth, 
December 1982, pp. 57-59. 
a3See S.J. Patel, Reflections on the economic crisis and (he 
Third World (mimeographed text). 
theory shows little concern for growth and full 
employment; the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system and its replacement by a system of fluc-
tuating exchange rates, which introduces insta-
bility and uncertainty into the international eco-
nomic system; changes in the labour and mer-
chandise markets and the creation of strong in-
flationary expectations as a determining factor in 
price-Fixing and wages; the oil shocks; the end of 
a phase of rapid increase in productivity in the 
European countries and Japan, which have now 
made up the leeway with which they started after 
the war and are approaching a slowly expanding 
technological frontier, determined essentially by 
the United States economy; the exhaustion of the 
productivity increments attributable to structur-
al transfers from agriculture to industry and to 
international specialization; and, lastly, the 
establishment of restrictive policies which reduce 
productivity by stunting the growth of the stock 
of capital and undermining the efficiency of re-
source allocation.24 
On the Latin American internai plane, the 
transnational development style which so dyna-
mically asserted itself during the post-war dec-
ades, on the basis of unbridled promotion of 
immitative consumption, began to show serious 
shortcomings and disequilibria as early as the 
1960s. It managed to keep going until 1980, 
however, thanks to international liquidity and 
the great financial permissiveness which made it 
possible to step up the expansion of consump-
tion, investment and exports by means of exter-
nal and internal borrowing. The recent interna-
tional recession has therefore had exceptionally 
serious repercussions on Latin America, bring-
ing to light in addition the gravity of the structu-
ral problems which the development style had 
long been trailing in its wake, and which the 
financial boom had made it possible to cover up. 
They are essentially problems of external imbal-
ance, dependence and vulnerability; of inten-
sive concentration of the fruits of economic and 
social progress, in terms both of income and 
ownership and of their geographical comple-
x é e A. Maddison, Phases of..., op. cit. A similar list is to 
be found in W. Arthur Lewis, "The slowing down of the 
engine of growth", The American Economic Review, September 
1980, Vol. 70, No. 4, pp. 558-559. 
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ment; and of unemployment, underemploy-
ment and poverty and socio-political marginality 
in very large sectors of the population. 
As r e g a r d s the ex te rna l s t ruc tu ra l 
framework, to the traditional problems of insta-
bility and the relative downward trend of com-
modity prices, exacerbated in a climate of slug-
gishness and great instability in the industrial-
ized economy, are added strong protectionist 
pressures, especially in respect of certain tradi-
tional agricultural products and the new exports 
of manufactures which the Latin American 
countries have been taking such pains to develop 
in order to diversify their exports and obtain 
access to an international economy which is now 
closing its doors to them. 
On the imports side, the period of expansion 
and prosperity in the international economic and 
financial system permitted the consolidation of a 
transnationalized segment of the national econo-
mies, characterized by life styles and consump-
tion patterns that imply a capital- and oil-
intensive structure of production and technolo-
gy with a high and very dynamic external con-
tent. This has been a serious problem not only 
for the petroleum-importing but also for the pe-
troleum-exporting economies. Severely cutting 
down imports in order to cope with the long-
term maladjustment, in a situation of high pe-
troleum prices and heavy external indebtedness, 
has implied a radical reduction of domestic con-
sumption and investment, with pernicious 
effects on employment and levels of living 
among the low-income majorities. Meanwhile 
behaviour patterns, habits and expectations have 
been generated which are totally untenable, and 
which together with the corresponding aggrava-
tion of unemployment and poverty, will inevita-
bly break out in the end in acute social and 
political tensions. 
To serve the debt or not to serve it, that is the 
question today. All the Latin American govern-
ments declare that they want to serve it, but many 
This is, moreover, the basic reason why the 
crisis has so drastically affected Latin America, 
and even some of the socialist countries, which 
have also been invaded by the transnationaliza-
tion process, with its sequel of increasing exter-
nal imbalances and accelerated international pri-
vate borrowing.25 The rest of the Third World, 
relatively less infiltrated by the transnational 
phenomenon, for both economic and cultural 
reasons, has not experienced to a similar extent 
either its past dynamic impulse or its present 
crisis. 
In view of the prospects of a gloomy future 
in the international economy —stagnation, insta-
bility, uncertainty and a financial crisis— and the 
increasing seriousness of the structural problems 
of the development style both in the industrial 
countries and in our own, there can be no doubt 
of the misguided inadequacy of an approach 
concentrating on overcoming short-term prob-
lems by means of adjustment to a temporary 
recession in the international economy. It is a 
matter of supreme urgency to reformulate long-
term development strategies, together with 
short- and long-term measures conducive simul-
taneously to surmounting the difficulties of the 
recession and unemployment, and directing de-
velopment towards a more dynamic, equitable 
and autonomous style, sustainable over the long 
term. Regional co-operation among the Latin 
American countries, and between these and the 
other Third World countries, should play a fun-
damental role in this new development strategy. 
^United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
The impact of international economic relations on medium- and 
long-term trends and prospects, December 1982, pp. 16-25 and 
34-37. 
have been unable to do so and have left matters 
in suspense for spells of as long as six months. 
Nor have they been able to let this situation drag 
VI 
Development and reactivation: conditioning factors 
and options 
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on for any greater length of time, finding them-
selves compelled to negotiate an agreement with 
the International Monetary Fund. This latter is 
imposing monetarist policies of severe restriction 
of global demand, designed to generate balance-
of-payments surpluses on current account, in ex-
change for which it facilitates the refinancing of 
the debt for annual periods, with contributions of 
its own and from the creditor banks. These 
agreements have managed to survive in some 
cases but in others have been unable to withstand 
internal socio-political pressures, so that this very 
short-term cycle starts all over again. Thus we 
have gone on for three years, waiting for Godot 
to bring a world reactivation that has not yet 
come, and probably never will. 
This reveals a situation in which the costs of 
serving the debt and of not serving it are alike 
intolerable in terms of economic and social pen-
ury, and of political instability. The transnational 
banks and the developed countries are prepared 
to accept temporary moratoria and prefer short-
term refinancing, a sign that they fear the con-
sequences of a financial breakdown; but they do 
not dare to embark upon long-term refinancing 
or financing, a sign that they place no reliance on 
the resumption of dynamic international de-
velopment or on the payment capacity of the 
debtor countries. Neither alternative would 
appear to offer a way out. They are only momen-
tary stopgap arrangements, with no prospect 
ahead but a gradual worsening of the existing 
situation. 
It is essential to avoid catastrophic options, as 
well as the current deterioration. To that end, an 
international and national strategy of greater 
scope and breadth would need to be designed. It 
would be a question of establishing common 
basic principles for the creation of a new set of 
international public institutions to support de-
velopment and the dynamization and stability of 
the in ternat ional economy. Within this 
framework, each country would be able to 
negotiate its debt or not, according to its own 
special circumstances, but in a context that 
favoured development rather than hampering 
it. However, the efforts in this direction that have 
been made year after year have met with no 
response in the leading industrialized countries. 
Furthermore, it is absolutely indispensable 
that the industrial countries should start out 
again on the road of economic expansion and 
should reopen their economies to international 
trade on the basis of active industrial and agri-
cultural readjustment policies and the mainte-
nance of policies of full utilization of production 
capacity. The Bank for International Settle-
ments itself recognizes that room for manoeuvre 
has been created which makes greater economic 
activity possible without the risk of unmanage-
able inflationary pressures, and that restrictive 
monetarist policies have been carried too far.21' 
Nevertheless, the analysis presented in the fore-
going sections reveals the serious structural and 
political obstacles to such an advance. 
The exorbitant external debt accumulated 
by most of the Latin American countries is the 
responsibility of the transnational banks, of the 
governments of the industrial countries and of 
the governments and ruling classes of the debtor 
countries. The servicing of this debt is impossible 
on a basis of constricting the debtor economies 
and reducing them to a state of stagnation. That 
will inevitably lead to further defaulting. 
Moreover, it is morally unacceptable that the 
burden of the debt should be laid by monetarist 
policies, through unemployment and reductions 
of real wages, on present and future generations 
of workers who have had nothing to do with it. It 
is therefore indispensable that the cost of debt 
servicing should be shared by those responsible 
for the debt and those that have enjoyed its 
ephemeral benefits. At the international level, 
the transnational banks and the governments of 
the industrial countries must assume their quota 
of responsibility, facilitating debt servicing by 
extendig maturities to periods of 20 or 30 years, 
establishing grace periods of at least five years 
and reducing real interest rates to their historical 
levels. In addition, these countries must provide 
new long-term credit at similar rates of interest 
so that reactivation can be achieved through new 
development strategies in the debtor economies. 
Nor are these objectives easy to attain, although 
implicit or sometimes explicit recognition is 
beginning to be accorded to the necessity of 
making some move in this direction. 
2bBank for International Settlements, op. cit., pp. 7 and 
31. 
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At the internal level, the more heavily 
indebted the Latin American countries are, the 
more need they have to reformulate their 
development policies, directing them towards 
three fundamental objectives: employment, 
export expansion and diversification and the 
concentration of available resources on meeting 
the basic needs of the deprived masses. Only a 
reasonable and sustainable proportion of the 
foreign exchange obtained from export earnings 
should be allocated to debt servicing; the rest 
should be reserved for importing essential goods 
directly or indirectly for popular consumption 
and capital accumulation, the latter in its turn to 
be used exclusively to satisfy popular consumer 
requirements and accumulation itself. The 
restriction of non-essential consumer imports 
would be the contribution of the privileged 
sectors to the servicing of the external debt for 
which they were partly responsible. 
The adoption of measures favouring an in-
ternal reactivation geared to the application of a 
new development strategy calls for a freedom of 
manoeuvre in economic policy which the agree-
ments with IMF prevent. As was pointed out at 
the beginning of the present article, the crucial 
dilemma facing economic policy at the present 
time is the question of how to achieve a severe 
compression of imports which will allow a con-
siderable surplus to be built up on current 
account for the purpose of serving the external 
debt. The monetarist prescription, one of the 
objectives of which is to maintain or obtain exter-
nal openness, consists in restricting global ex-
penditure on consumption and investment to the 
point at which demand for imports dwindles 
sufficiently for this objective to be attained, while 
it is assumed at the same time that in this way 
resources will be set free to increase exports. 
According to our analysis, this approach is mis-
taken and overburdensome in economic and so-
cial terms. Mistaken, because the mobility of the 
factors of production is low and the short-, 
medium- and long-term prospects of the inter-
national economy are discouraging, so that a 
rapid and considerable expansion of the volume 
and value of exports is very unlikely unless as the 
consequence of a deliberate medium-term policy 
at the national and international level. Over-
costly, in terms of employment and popular con-
sumption, because the import demand function 
can be modified by direct acts of intervention to 
restrict imports through taxes, tariff duties and 
exchange controls, discriminating between those 
that are essential and those that are of less critical 
importance, and thus ensuring a level of invest-
ment, production and essential consumption 
which will minimize the effect of the crisis on 
employment and the levels of living of the lower-
income sectors. While this policy involves a 
change in relative prices and assuredly a rise in 
price levels, it does not necessarily imply uncon-
trollable inflation in so far as idle capacity exists, 
a tax policy is applied which strictly limits the 
income and expenditure of the most affluent 
sectors, and an income policy is adopted which 
prevents unjustified wage increases. 
Economic policy also requires enough free-
dom of manoeuvre for short-term reactivating 
measures to form part of a long-term develop-
ment strategy, oriented towards the objectives 
indicated above, and founded primarily on those 
natural, human and infrastructure resources 
with which these countries are fairly comfortably 
endowed, and which constitute the only sound 
and permanent basis for sustained development. 
Obviously, the less the negative international 
context improves and the less support is given to 
proposals in respect of trade, finance and in-
vestment, the more austere these policies will 
have to be. It is urgently necessary to face up to 
the possibility that perhaps nothing of any sig-
nificance may be obtained from the industrial-
ized world or the international institutions and 
carefully to explore what this would mean in 
terms of development strategies designed to 
cope with such a situation. 
The lessons taught by history must be learnt. 
A development of the productive forces which is 
directly channelled towards the satisfaction of 
the basic needs of the broad masses and the elim-
ination of dependence cannot be achieved 
through the massive incorporation of a trans-
national development style of the individualist-
consumist type, making highly intensive use of 
imported capital, energy and technology. This 
has not been possible either through the deliber-
ate promotion of such "modernization" (post-
Keynesian developmentism), or —much less 
still— through indiscriminate external openness 
and privatization (monetarism), even in an ex-
ceptionally favourable international context. 
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS / Osvaldo Sunkel 105 
The transnational style simply cannot be gener-
alized to the whole of society. In the best instance, 
the case of developmentism, it benefits a minor-
ity more or less sizeable according to the country 
concerned, but the broad masses linger on in 
hopeless poverty. In the case of monetarism, in-
security is far greater, development and diversi-
fication of the structure of production far less, 
and external vulnerability and dependence are 
overwhelming. 
It cannot but be recognized that true nation-
al and regional development will have to be 
based primordially on transformation of the re-
sources and natural environment in which Latin 
America is relatively rich, incorporating the 
efforts of the entire population, together with 
the adoption of life styles and consumption pat-
terns and of techniques and modes of organiza-
tion appropriate to this natural and human en-
vironment; with very prudent and efficient uti-
lization of the little capital available, especially its 
imported component; and all this with the explic-
it aim of producing current goods and services 
and accumulating the basic social capital re-
quired by the majority sectors of the population to 
improve their levels of living and of productivity. 
It must not be forgotten that in this respect Latin 
America has substantially improved its poten-
tialities in recent decades. 
Regional co-operation must play a role of the 
greatest importance in these new internal and 
international tasks: at the level of North-South 
negotiations, by persisting in the promotion of a 
reform of the international system such as that 
suggested above, and in this context, supporting 
the renegotiation of the external debt of coun-
tries so requiring on the terms indicated, but at 
the same time exploring the alternatives that 
might be adopted should this line of action fail. A 
second aspect of supreme significance is the re-
vitalization of the regional integration institu-
tions, which will facilitate inter-Latin American 
trade, payments and investment, and to which 
end greater room for manoeuvre in economic 
policy will also be needed. A further crucial 
aspect is support for all possible forms of integra-
tion and co-operation as between the Latin 
American region and the rest of the Third 
World. Lastly, it would be impossible to exagger-
ate the importance of economic and technical 
co-operation, in every respect, and particularly 
as regards exchange of experience and informa-
tion on all topics pertinent to the new national 
and international development strategies sug-
gested. 
From the type of analysis set forth in this 
article it is obvious that the proposals put for-
ward, both at the domestic and at the interna-
tional and regional level, imply radical political 
changes. In the last analysis, it is necessary that 
the predominance of international trade and 
financial interests and their respective local 
transnational bases be replaced by broad nation-
al coalitions, representative of a majority of social 
sectors, which accord priority to the expansion of 
employment and economic activity and to in-
come distribution, rather than to excessive con-
cern for monetary and financial equilibrium. 
This happened in many countries after the 1930 
crisis, and it may be that the crisis of today will do 
much to enforce a similar adjustment. But this is 
not a matter of history repeating itself. There are 
now new social sectors which did not exist in the 
past or which were ousted or bypassed by recent 
development policies. They include, among 
others, the vast marginal urban sectors and the 
rural pockets of extreme poverty, the new con-
tingents of young people who have had access to 
education, the labour force resulting from the 
incorporation of women into the labour market, 
the important highly-skilled middle strata, all of 
which would have to be well represented in the 
formulation and implementation of the new de-
velopment strategy that is needed now to over-
come the crisis. 
This is the most important of the many issues 
that will have to be very seriously tackled as part 
of the effort to find new paths to development. 
